COL KOH VS CA

G.R. No. L-40428 December 17, 1975

FRANCISCO T. KOH, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., District Judge, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch I, and JOSE P. COLOMA, respondents.

Koh Law Offices for petitioner.

Ferdinand A. Valentin for respondents.

ESGUERRA, J.:

Petition for certiorari with writ of preliminary injunction to review and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals (Eighth Division) in CA-G.R. No. SP-03322, entitled "Francisco T. Koh, petitioner vs. Jose P. Coloma and Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr., Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch I, respondents". The appellate Court found "no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge in not dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue"; dismissed the petition for injunction and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it previously issued against the respondents.

The undisputed facts contained in petitioner's brief as adopted in respondents' brief are:

On February 21, 1974, private respondent (Jose Coloma) filed a Complaint for damages against the herein petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch I, the same being docketed as Civil Case No. 5011-1 (Annex A of Amended Petition). On April 8, 1974, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the said Complaint on the grounds that the same fails to state a sufficient cause of action and that venue has been improperly laid. (Annex B of Amended Petition) On May 8, 1974, petitioner filed a Manifestation before the lower court apprising it that the copy of the Motion To Dismiss sent to private respondent (counsel for private respondent did not specify any address in the Complaint other than his alleged address in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte) was returned unserved by the Bureau of Post for the reason that he was unknown in the said address. (San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte) Annexes "C" and "D" of Amended Petition.

On May 28, 1974, petitioner's counsel received a Notice from the lower court setting the hearing of the Motion To Dismiss for June 4, 1974. In response to this notice, petitioner on May 31, 1974 filed a Manifestation informing the lower court that he, was submitting the motion without further arguments. Three (3) days before the scheduled hearing of the Motion to Dismiss, specifically on June 11, 1974, counsel for petitioner received a copy of private respondents' opposition to his Motion To Dismiss. Finding that the private respondents pleading required comment, on June 18, 1974, petitioner herein filed a Reply thereto (Annex G of Amended Petition).

On July 9, 1974, petitioner, thru counsel, received a copy of the Order of the lower court denying the Motion To Dismiss (Annex A of Amended Petition. However from the registry return card of the corresponding pleadings, it was apparent that the Order denying our Motion To Dismiss dated June 25, 1974 of the lower court aforementioned did not consider the facts and exhibits reflected in petitioner's Reply To Opposition To Motion To Dismiss inasmuch as the same was received by the lower court on June 27, 1974 (2 days later) after the Order had been issued (the petitionees pleadings in the said case were all filed with the court thru registered mail special delivery due to the distance involved). For this reason, and within the period authorized by law, on July 11, 1974 petitioner filed a Motion For Reconsideration of the said Order reiterating therein the matter stated in his Reply to Opposition which was not considered by the lower court (Annex I of Amended Petition). This Motion for Reconsideration was opposed by private respondent.

In an Order dated July 19, 1974, the lower court issued an Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner.

From the Orders of the lower court dated June 25, 1974 and July 19, 1974, the petitioner herein instituted certiorari proceedings with preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeal the same being docketed as CA-G.R. No. L-03322. For failure of the petitioner to attach thereto certified true copies of the Orders appealed from by reason of their unavailability, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition. However, on September 5, 1974, petitioner herein filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution of the Court of Appeals and on September 24, 1974, the said Motion was favorably acted upon and the petition was given due course. On October 9, 1974, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction in the said case enjoining the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte from further proceeding thereon.

After the issues on the peticion were joined by the filing of the ANSWER for the respondents dated October 15, 1974, the case was set for oral arguments after which the parties were required to submit, simultaneously, their respective memoranda. Only petitioner herein filed his Memorandum in support of his petition. Private respondents did not submit their memorandum.

In a resolution dated March 19, 1975, the Court of Appeals dismiss the petition for certiorari and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.

Hence this petition for review and reversal of said resolution of March 19, 1975.

The only issue raised before Us is whether or not respondent Appellate Court erred and thus committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before it; in holding that private respondent Jose P. Coloma is a resident of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and thereby holding that venue of the action before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte was proper, and in finding that the complaint of private respondent Coloma in the trial court recites a sufficient cause of action.

Respondent Appellate Court predicted its decision on the finding that despite the petitioner's receipt of a copy of the opposition to the petitioner's motion to dismiss filed by private respondent Coloma in the trial court, petitioner failed to appear during the healing of his notion to dismiss the complaint on June 14, 1974; that "the parties were given the opportunity to adduce proofs and advance arguments to support their respective sides and on the basis of whatever were adduced during the hearing, it rendered a ruling in the exercise of its jurisdiction; "that" the lower court in its ruling cited the evidence it relied upon and doctrines which supported and justified its findings and conclusions;" that "considering that there is no showing of whimsical and capricious exercise of discretion, it could be said that if ever there was an error committed by the respondent judge, it was an error of judgment in the exercise of his discretion which is correctable by appeal;" and that it concurred with the lower court's order denying the motion to dismiss which is anchored on the argument that the question of residence of a person is one of intent. In the instant case, the trial Court concluded that San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, is the residencia of plaintiff as contemplated in paragraph (b) Section 2 of Rule 4.

Under ordinary circumstances the foregoing reasoning and findings of the trial court and the respondent Appellate Court could be considered highly tenable and justifiably defensible, but We simply cannot ignore petitioner's allegation in his motion to dismiss filed in the trial court that "this clearly is a nuisance action brought before the Honorable Court to require the defendant (petitioner) to travel and appear in Laoag, Ilocos Norte" as well as the background of the present case and compels Us to delve deeper into the possible motives of private respondent in choosing as situs for his claim for damages against petitioner the rather relatively far Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.

It is clear that Civil Case No. 5011 (for Damages) (Annex "A" to this Petition) filed by private respondent Coloma in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, wherein Coloma is asking for damages to the tune of P173,000.00 from petitioner for alleged "malicious, baseless, and unfounded criminal complaint" filed by petitioner against Coloma, arose from the following alleged incidents, to wit:

That sometime on May 21, 1970, the defendant (petitioner) Francisco T. Koh filed before the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, a complaint of Forcible Entry and Detainer against the plaintiff (private respondent Coloma) for the possession of a house and lot located at 480, Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal, on which plaintiff (Coloma) and his family were all residing,

That to avert the ejectment of plaintiff (Coloma) and his family from the aforecited house, plaintiff (Coloma) and defendant (petitioner) entered into a compromise settlement in court whereby plaintiff (Coloma) will pay to defendant (petitioner) the total amount of P3,125.00,

That to insure the payment of the aforecited obligation plaintiff (Coloma) issued to defendant (petitioner) a Manila Banking Corporation check No. 17010812 post-dated February 27, 1971;

That in post-dating the aforecited check, plaintiff (Coloma) explicitly explained to defendant (petitioner) that there is not sufficient funds at the time in the Bank to cover the amount the necessity to post- date it with the expectation that Plaintiff (Coloma) will deposit the necessary amount on or before the due date;

That for certain beyond the control of plaintiff (Coloma), he failed to deposit the required amount on the date due, so that defendant (petitioner) Francisco T. Koh forcibly the plaintiff and his family from their aforecited residence the following day, February 28, 1971;

That defendant (petitioner), still not contented in having successfully evicted plaintiff (Coloma) mo his family from their residence, defendant (petitioner) filed a criminal complaint against the plaintiff (Coloma) before the Fiscal's Office at Pasig, Rizal, over the Manila Banking Corporation check in question, which complaint was later filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal;

That defendant personally applied and actively participated in the criminal case as a private prosecutor in collaboration with the prosecuting fiscal;

That the Court of First Instance of Rizal, upon motion of plaintiff (Coloma) dismissed said criminal complaint in its order dated Sept. 26, 1972.

Private respondent Coloma convinced the trial court, although he admitted that he is presently residing at No. 57 K-6th Street, Kamias, Quezon City, that he could be considered a legal resident domiciled at San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, because he was born and he grew up there; that his parents and his brothers and sisters still live there; that their ancestral home and lands are situated there; that he studied in Ilocos Norte up to his graduation in the Ilocos Norte High School; that if ever he came to Manila, it was for the purpose of pursuing a college carrer; that he goes home time and again to oversee their properties' harvests as he is the oldest; that if he is staying in Quezon City now, it is because his wife is a government employee as staff nurse in the Philippine General Hospital; and after her retirement, he and his family intends to return to his hometown of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and establish his permanent home there.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that on May 8, 1974, he filed a Manifestation before the lower court apprising it that the copy of the motion to dismiss was sent to private respondent Coloma (counsel for Coloma did not specify any address in the complaint) in his alleged address of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, but the same was returned unserved by the Bureau of Posts for the reason that he (Coloma) was unknown in the said address of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Annex "C" and "D" of Amended Petition); that in pleadings under oath filed in several judicial proceedings involving petitioner and private respondent, the latter asserted his actual and present residence as either 486 Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal or No. 57, K-6th Kamias, Quezon City, Rizal, to wit:

1. Jose P. Coloma vs. Francisco T. Koh, Administrative Case No. 1060, Supreme Court;

2. Jose P. Coloma vs. Francisco T. Koh, Civil Case No. 14067, C.F.I. Rizal, Branch XI;

3. Jose P. Coloma, et al. vs. Francisco T. Koh, Civil Case No. 15450, C.F.I. Rizal, Branch VI;

4. Jose P. Coloma, et al. vs. Hon. Cesar C. Cruz, et al., C.F.I. Rizal, Civil Case No. 14687;

5. Jose P. Coloma, et al., vs. Hon. Presiding Justice Salvador V. Esguerra, et al., Supreme Court, G.R. No. L-35945;

6. Jose P. Coloma vs. Hon. Cesar C. Cruz, et al., C.F.I. Rizal, Civil Case No. 14140;

7. Jose P. Coloma, et al. vs Hon. V.M. Ruiz, et al., C.A.-G.R. No. SP-00329;

8. Francisco T. Koh vs. Hon. Guardson Lood, et al., C.A.-G.R. No.
00785-R;

9. Jose P. Coloma vs. Hon. Juan Enriquez, et al., G.R. No. L-36425;

that both private respondent Coloma and his wife Crisanta A. Coloma are registered voters in the Greater Manila Area, it appearing in Jose P. Coloma's Voter's I.D. No. A- 4941010 and Mrs. Coloma's Voter's I.D. No. A-4941009 that they are residents of No. 486 Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that the complaint filed against petitioner for damages in the C. F. 1. of Ilocos Norte, was prepared in Manila, signed by a Manila lawyer, verified in Manila by private respondent who showed his Residence Certificate issued in Manila (R.C.A-324643, issued on March 8, 1973, in Manila); that the filing of the complaint for damages before the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte was "purely for the purpose of harrassment and that venue of the action was improperly laid".

It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is a established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residenceapplies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

This Court held in the case of Uytengsu vs. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous stand inLarena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36 and Nuval v. Guray 52 Phil. 645, that —

There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile, denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the in ten petition of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. (Emphasis supplied)

We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words "resides or may be found," and not "is domiciled," thus:

Sec. 2(b) Personal actions — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos, Norte, based on his manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2 (b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions. The admission of private respondent Coloma that when he brought the action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, he was "residing at No. 57 K-6th Street, Kamias, Quezon City" is to Our mind absolutely fatal to all his contentions of good faith in bringing that action in a distant place and at the same time quite revealing of his motive for doing so, when We take into consideration the basis of the action for damages against petitioner which is the criminal prosecution for estafa against private respondent Coloma arising from a bank check he used to pay petitioner and was dishonored for lack of funds; respondent Coloma's proven acts in having the civil complaint for damages prepared in Manila by a Manila lawyer, verified in Manila and filed in Ilocos Norte C.F.I. and the numerous cases between petitioner and respondent Coloma in this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Rizal Courts of First Instance wherein respondent Coloma swore under oath that he is a resident of 486 Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal and No. 57, K-6th Kamuning, Quezon City.

An examination of the cause of action contained in the civil complaint for damages filed by respondent Coloma against petitioner in Civil Case No. 5011 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte raises lingering doubts in Our mind as to the existence of a valid and justified cause of action, for it prays for P173,000.00 worth of alleged damages (actual, moral exemplary and attorney's fees) based on an alleged "malicious, baseless, and unfounded complaint" filed by petitioner against respondent Coloma, when it could be seen from the civil complaint itself that the basis of the action for damages is the criminal prosecution of respondent Coloma for the crime of estafa in the C.F.I. of Rizal because of the complaint of petitioner arising from the post-dated check admittedly issued by respondent Coloma which was dishonored for lack of funds. It can readily be seen from the record that it was the Fiscal of Rizal who filed the criminal complaint for estafa against respondent Coloma after preliminary investigation when the fiscal was convinced of the existence of a prima facie case against Coloma. While it is true that petitioner was the offended party because the dishonored check was issued in his favor and that he acted as private prosecutor when the case was filed in the C.F.I. of Rizal because there was no separate civil action filed against Coloma arising from the same cause of alleged estafa, it certainly cannot be said that as offended party in the criminal case and by initiating the same criminal case against respondent Coloma he (petitioner) was the one who filed the "malicious, baseless and unfounded complaint" against private respondent Coloma. To establish the filing of the criminal case against Coloma by the Fiscal of Rizal as "malicious" is highly problematical because the Fiscal of Rizal conducted a preliminary investigation on the same and if he in the exercise of his quasi-judicial duty believed there was a prima facie case against respondent Coloma that made him file the case, his act cannot be called "malicious". We note here that the petitioner was not the one who filed the criminal case against the respondent Coloma, the former being merely the offended party. The criminal complaint against respondent Coloma could hardly be termed "baseless and unfounded" because he himself admitted that he issued a post-dated check that was dishonored. If the criminal complaint against him was dismiss by the C.F.I. of Rizal upon his own motion and perchance by some reason of technicality or by reason of reasonable doubt, respondent Coloma is by no means absolved from the civil liability of refunding the amount written in the dishonored check to the petitioner. The logical conclusion that could be derived from all the foregoing is that the criminal complaint filed against respondent Coloma for Estafa by the Fiscal of Rizal is by no means "malicious", "baseless", and "unfounded" and, therefore, the action for damages is without any basis and that respondent Coloma's civil complaint for damages filed in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte was without sufficient cause of action.

We observe in the examination of the record of this case, that private respondent Coloma can go to the extent of resorting to other means while this case pending in the respondent Court of Appeals to find a solution to another aspect of the raging controversy between petitioner and private respondent. As a result of respondent Coloma's filing of a complaint for damages (Civil Case No. 5011) against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, wherein respondent Coloma alleged that "he is a resident of the Municipality of San Nicolas, Province of Ilocos Norte," Petitioner filed in the Fiscal's Office of Manila a case of perjury against respondent Coloma and the Investigating Fiscal in his resolution believed in the existence of a prima facie case against him. Respondent Coloma was able to get a directive from the Secretary of Justice, dated Sept. 3, 1974, reversing the findings of the Investigating Fiscal and instructing the City Fiscal of Manila to have the case "dismissed, immediately upon receipt hereof". At any rate, We are convinced that the misunderstanding between petitioner and private respondent Coloma has gone to such an extent that it would not be surprising for respondent Coloma to be motivated by vengeance when he filed his action for damages against the petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte in order to get even with and impose all kinds of inconveniences on the petitioner. Otherwise,' it would have been easier and very much more convenient for both parties if the civil action for damages against petitioner had been filed either in the C.F.I. of Quezon City or Pasig, Rizal, because both petitioner and private respondent are admittedly residing within the greater Manila area.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court is hereby reversed; the Orders dated June 25, 1974, and July 19, 1974, in Civil Case No. 5011-1 of the Court of the First Instance of Ilocos Norte are set aside; the complaint in the aforementioned case is hereby dismissed for improper venue and lack of sufficient cause of action, and the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte or his successor in office is restrained from further proceeding with the hearing of said case.

With costs against private respondent Coloma.

SO ORDERED.

COL VIVO VS CLORIBEL 2.0

ISSUE:

G.R. No. L-25442           June 29, 1968

HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, as Commissioner of Immigration, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Judge of the CFI of Manila, TSOI SAU CHUN, CHUA LE GUAT and her minor children ANG KIE LIM AND FEI CHING and ANG CHAK CHI, LAM PEK YUK, KWOK KAM LIEN and her minor children YU KIAN TIOK and YU LILY; SY SIOK HIAN and her minor children ONG LAI YUEN, ONG ANG KIAM and WONG LAI SHU; and TSAI BUN and her minor child NG KAM YUK, respondents.

                                                                                  

This case is an offshoot of G.R. No. L-22354, decided by this Court on March 31, 1965.

It will be recalled that the herein private respondents are Chinese citizens who, on various dates, arrived in the Philippines as temporary visitors, and succeeded in securing several extensions of their stay in this country.

On or about February, 1962, allegedly upon solicitation of the then Macapagal administration for foreign capital, five of these respondents requested the President of the Philippines to be allowed to invest some money in the Philippines. The request was indorsed by the then Acting Commissioner of Immigration who suggested favorable action thereon, in line with the socio-economic policy of the Government. While their requests were pending, the said aliens sought further extensions of their stay as temporary visitors but these were denied by the President; portion of the letter of denial reads thus:

As to your request for presidential sanction on the desire of said aliens to make investments in the Philippines and for guidance on the procedure to be followed in the implementation of their investment projects, it is suggested that the matter be taken up directly with the Chairman of the National Economic Council and the Secretary of Commerce and Industry who may thereafter make the necessary recommendation to this Office.

On August 29, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration issued Circular No. 101 providing that the authorized stay of all "bonded alien temporary visitors who arrived in the Philippines in 1961 and prior years are hereby terminated, and requests for extension of such periods will not be entertained and that all said aliens should leave not later than September 19, 1962, if their prior authorized stay expires later than September 19, 1962, and those having dates of expiry before said date should leave on the corresponding expiry dates."

Alleging that the Commissioner of Immigration acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack of and/or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the said circular, the aliens filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the enforcement of said circular. The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the Commissioner and granted the prayer to allow the said aliens to deposit with the court their extension fees.

After a protracted trial, the lower court rendered judgment, thus:

... This court is of the opinion that the public interest that is warranted in the exercise of the provisions of this Section 47 (a) 2 is clearly the official government invitation of foreign capital mentioned prominently in the said presidential directive of July 31st and August 17th as the basis of the authority granted the herein petitioners allowing them to invest in the Philippines. And the covering law of their immigration status is Section 47 (a) 2 already aforestated legally vesting the petitioners with the status of special non-immigrant under the said covering law. The Immigration Circular No. V-101 is inapplicable to the instant case of the petitioners inasmuch as said circular seeks application on temporary visitors and aliens other than those covered by the exercise of the provisions of Section 47 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 and Petitioners are held by this Court to be under the provisions of Section 47.

The Commissioner of Immigration was by that decision ordered to register the aliens as special non-immigrants under Section 47(a) 2 of the Immigration Act of 1940, in lieu of their recorded non-immigrant status; to authorize them to continue operating their business establishment until December 31, 1967, and to liquidate their business investments, repatriate their capital and depart for their country of origin on or before said date; and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction theretofore issued.

Upon appeal here (said G.R. No. L-22354) the CFI decision was reversed, this Court declaring:

... the appellees without right to stay in the Philippines and/or to be considered special non-immigrants; the respondent Commissioner of Immigration with power and authority to order their departure. It is further ordered that appellees return the amount of P1,700.00 to the government and of P10.00 per month extension fees, from the time they began staying in the Philippines, over and beyond the period authorized by the Commissioner of Immigration until they leave. The injunction by the lower court having been issued illegally and improvidently, should be as it is hereby, dissolved. Costs against appellees.

The aliens failed to leave the country upon finality of the decision. Instead, on October 11, 1965, they wrote the Commissioner of Immigration requesting that they be allowed the "use and enjoyment of their rights to a valid and lawful extended stay decreed in their favor by the Supreme Court of the Philippines in its decision in Case No. G.R. L-22354, at least temporarily until they leave and depart for their country of origin not earlier than the termination of President Macapagal's Socio Economic Program."

This request was denied by the Commissioner of Immigration and so the aliens filed again with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction praying for judgment ordering the respondent to accept and receipt for all monthly payments of P10.00 per person extension fees; and ordering the respondent Commissioner to schedule the departure of the aliens not earlier than the period contemplated in the socio-economic program of the President (Civil Case No. 63135).

On October 29, 1965, the herein respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance gave due course to the petition and issued an order directing the Commissioner of Immigration "to desist from executing the acts complained of."

This petition seeks to annul the said order of October 29, 1965.

Requiring the herein respondents to answer the petition, this Court, at the commencement of these proceedings on December 23, 1965, issued a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining the respondent Judge, in the meanwhile, from enforcing the order dated October 29, 1965, and from otherwise taking cognizance of and assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 63135.

On January 3, 1966, counsel for herein private respondents filed with this Court a manifestation praying that the case be dismissed for lack of cause of action, attaching thereto a true copy of a "Motion to Withdraw Petition" in Civil Case No. 63135, filed by said respondents in the Court below, pertinent portions of which read:

1) That by virtue of a Supreme Court resolution dated December 14, 1965, copy attached as ANNEX "A" hereof received by petitioners on December 24, 1965, thru ordinary mail, and issued in Case No. G. R. L-22354 (Kwok Kam Lien, et al. vs. The Hon. M. P. Vivo, etc.) the Supreme Court has just remanded to this very court the said Case No. G. R. L-22354;

2) That meanwhile, when this case was filed with this Honorable Court on October 28, 1965; it was after respondent Commissioner of Immigration sought to arrest your petitioners on October 22, 1965, two (2) days after the reglementary period expired since petitioners received the denial of their last motion to reconsider the Supreme Court decision in said Case No. L-22354 which denial was received by petitioners on September 25, 1965, such that the cause of action of your petitioners in this case was based primarily on the Supreme court decision having become final and executory on October 20, 1965;

3) That the aforestated resolution of the Supreme Court dated December 14, 1965, was in virtue of a separate motion for reconsideration NG HUI CHING, which in effect further extended the reglementary period without the knowledge of herein petitioners;

4) That in view of the said resolution of the Supreme Court dated December 14, 1965, the instant petition with this Honorable Court in the above-entitled case is now left without support on its cause of action and therefore your petitioners has no other alternative than to withdraw their petition in this case.

In the meanwhile, this Court denied the prayer for dismissal of the petition. The Solicitor General then filed his memorandum for the petitioner. In their reply memorandum, respondents reiterate their prayer for dismissal of the case, calling our attention to the fact that the Solicitor General, while having discussed the issues raised, has forgotten to make mention of the above-quoted manifestation filed by respondents.

The respondent judge was served with the writ of preliminary injunction, issued by this Court, a day before respondents' withdrawal motion in Civil Case No. 63135. Said injunction having restrained him from further taking cognizance of the case, the Judge could not issue any order of dismissal pursuant to the motion, although from the facts above narrated, the discontinuance of Civil Case No. 63135 will not possibly yield any disadvantage or prejudice upon the Government. The respondent Judge should thus grant the respondent's motion to withdraw and thereby dissolve the restraining order issued therein on October 29, 1965.

Upon the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the withdrawal of said Civil Case No. 63135 in the court below, this case has become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed, without costs, with the pronouncement, however, that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-22354 be immediately and fully implemented. Costs against private respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.

COL Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, supra

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, supra

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. She stated in the COC that she is a resident of the place for seven months. Private respondent Montejo subsequently filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification on the ground that Imelda failed to meet the constitutional requirement of one-year residency. COMELEC granted the Petition for Disqualification, holding that Imelda is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City as her place of domicile when she lived and even voted in Ilocos and Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda is deemed to have abandoned her domicile of origin

HELD:

An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residence in different places. Residence implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion that “she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places” flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election purposes.

CONFLICT OF LAWS Ellis vs. Republic, 7 SCRA 962 , April 30, 1963

Ellis vs. Republic, 7 SCRA 962 , April 30, 1963
Case Title : IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE, MARVIN G. ELLIS and GLORIA C. ELLIS, petitioners-appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Syllabi Class : Adoption
View Decision
No. L-16922. April 30, 1963.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE, MARVIN G. ELLIS and GLORIA C. ELLIS, petitioners-appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Adoption; Non-resident aliens cannot adopt in the Philip­pines.—Petitioners, who are husband and wife, had been in the Philippines for three (3) years at the time of the hearing of the petition for adoption, the husband being assigned as staff ser­geant in the U.S, Air Force Base in Angeles, Pampanga. Not being permanent residents, they cannot adopt in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that non-residents cannot adopt.
Same; Same; Nature of adoption proceedings.—Adoption proceedings being in rem, no court may entertain them unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also, over the res, which is the personal status not only of the person to be adopted, but also of the adopting parents. The Civil Code of the Philippines (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the states of a natural person is determined by his nationality. Pursuant there­to, the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the status of an alien petitioner in adoption proceedings. The political law of the Philippines is patterned after the Anglo-American legal system, which adopts the view that personal status, in general, is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the do­micillary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). Hence, under either the nationality theory or the domicillary theory, the Philippine courts cannot assume and ex­ercise jurisdiction over the status of petitioners, who are not domiciled in the Philippines, and, hence non-resident aliens.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Leonardo F. Lansangan for petitioners-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal taken by the Government from a decision of the
963
VOL. 7, APRIL 30, 1963
963
Ellis vs. Republic
Court of First Instance of Pampanga granting the petition of Marvin G. Ellis and Gloria C. Ellis for the adoption of a Filipino baby girl named Rose.
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Fransisco, California, is 28 years of age. On September 3, 1949, he married Gloria G. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959, at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa — an institution for unwed mothers and their babies — stating that she (the mother) could not take of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother’s family.)
Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition on January 14,1960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga where both lived at that time. They had been in the Philippines before, or, to exact, in 1953.
The only issue in this appeal is whether, not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that:
“The following cannot adopt:
x x x x x x x x x
“(4) Non-resident aliens;”
x x x x x x x x x
This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms, which unqualified deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in the Philippines.
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter
of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latters’ nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. Under our political law, which is patterned after the Anglo-American legal system, we have, likewise, adopted the latter’s view to the effect that personal status, in general, is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit adoption by non-resident aliens, and we have consistently refused to recognize the validity of foreign decrees of divorce — regardless of the grounds upon which the same are based — involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the forum, even when our laws authorized absolute divorce in the Philippines (Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb v. Hashim, 30 Phil. 22; Cousine Hix v. Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851; Barretto Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29, 1955)”.
Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines — and, hence, non-resident aliens – we cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over the status, under either the nationality theory or the domiciliary theory. In any event, whether the above — quoted provision of said Art. 335 is predicated upon lack of jurisdiction over the res or merely affects the cause of action, we have no authority to grant the relief prayed for by petitioners herein, and it has been so held in Caraballo v. Republic, L-15080 (April 25, 1962) and Katansik v. Republic L-15472 (June 30, 1962).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered denying the petition in this case.
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VOL. 7, APRIL 30, 1963
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Ellis vs. Republic
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., did not take part.
Decision reversed.
Notes.—Another reason why our law prohibits adoption by “non-resident aliens” is to prevent Filipino children from being taken away to foreign countries (Capistrano, Civil Code Annotated, et al., Vo. I, 1950 ed., p. 305).
The philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the welfare of the child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective (Santos, et al. v. Aranzanso, et al., L-23828, Feb. 28, 1966).

CONFLICT OF LAWS PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES v. TODARO 254 SCRA 153 June 8, 2007

PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES v. TODARO

254 SCRA 153 June 8, 2007

FACTS

Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the RTC of Makati City, a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).

Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company established by PIL to own and hold the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines; PCPI is the company established by PIL to undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald is the Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL; and, Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI; Todaro has been the managing director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and concrete aggregate production; he resigned from Betonval in February 1996; in May 1996, PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with their intention to establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the Philippines; Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to three months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company decide to invest in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis. Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. RTC dismissed the MTD which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE

W/N the RTC should have dismissed the case on the basis of forum non conveniens due to a presence of a foreign element

RULING

NO. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "xxx [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."

The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense.

Note: the case was also being dismissed on the ground that there was no cause of action but SC held that there was cause of action, to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. And it was also argued in this case that jurisdiction is with the NLRC and not with the RTC. SC held it was with RTC, SC has consistently held that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction.

CONFLICT OF LAWS Gil Miguel Puyat vs Ron Zabarte

Civil Law – Conflict of Laws – Processual Presumption – Forum Non Conveniens
Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Rule 34 – Summary Judgment

Gil Miguel Puyat, a foreigner, lost a collection suit filed against him by Ron Zabarte in a court in California, USA. The California court ordered Puyat to pay the amount of $241k. Puyat was only able to pay $5k.

In January 1994, Zabarte filed an action to enforce the California judgment here in the Philippines against Puyat. Puyat filed an Answer where he alleged, among others, that the California court had no jurisdiction over the case, hence, the foreign judgment is void. He likewise averred that the trial court had no jurisdiction because the issue involved are partnership matters which are under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Zabarte then filed a motion for summary judgment as he argued that Puyat’s Answer tendered no issue. The trial court granted the motion and eventually gave a favorable judgment for Zabarte. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

On appeal, Puyat now avers that the trial court should have never taken cognizance of the case because it had no jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the forum non conveniens rule. He averred that under this principle, since all the transaction involved in this case occurred in California, he being a foreigner, and the California law was not properly determined, the trial court had no jurisdiction. He also assailed the validity of the trial court’s act in granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Zabarte.

ISSUE: Whether or not Puyat is correct.

HELD: No. The allowance of summary judgment is proper. In this case, Puyat’s Answer did not really tender an issue. Summary judgment is resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays.  When affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to pierce the allegations in the pleadings and to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment.  In short, since the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. In this case, Puyat’s Answer merely alleged that the California court, a civil court, had no jurisdiction because the case involved was a partnership issue. He however admitted that the issue involved is the payment of money upon promissory notes with damages. Puyat also did not attach a copy of the complaint filed by Zabarte with the California court. As such, the trial court properly presumed, applying the principle of processual presumption, that the California law is the same as Philippine law  – that cases involving collection of money is cognizable by civil courts. And by applying the principle of processual presumption, there’s no longer a need to try the facts in this case, hence, a summary judgment was in order.

Anent the issue of forum non conveniens, such does not exist in this case. Under the principle of forum non conveniens, even if the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law, courts may nonetheless refuse to entertain a case for any of the following practical reasons:

1.       The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;

2.        The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice known as forum shopping[,] merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;

3.        The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded;

4.       The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.”

None of the above existed in this case, hence, the trial court properly took cognizance of the case.

CONFLICT OF LAWS PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al G.R. No. 103493 June 19, 1997

PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al
G.R. No. 103493
June 19, 1997

FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.

In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent Daic, assumed Ducat’s obligation under an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.

As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered by the note became due and demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.

While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint “For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment” against private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more than its true value.

Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.

The trial court granted Ducat’s MTD, stating that “the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non conveniens,” even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens.

The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.

ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S. court?

HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati

NO

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, §50 provides:

Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata.

Second. Nor is the trial court’s refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens:

First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after “vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances” require the court’s desistance.