TRANSPO Sarkies Tours Phils. V. IAC by princesslawyer

Sarkies Tours Phils. V. IAC

Facts:

On August 31, 1984, Fatima boarded petitioner’s bus from Manila to Legazpi. Her belongings consisting of 3 bags were kept at the baggage compartment of the bus, but during the stopover in Daet, it was discovered that only one remained. The others might have dropped along the way. Other passengers suggested having the route traced, but the driver ignored it. Fatima immediately told the incident to her mother, who went to petitioner’s office in Legazpi and later in Manila. Petitioner offered P1,000 for each bag, but she turned it down. Disapointed, she sought help from Philtranco bus drivers and radio stations. One of the bags was recovered. She was told by petitioner that a team is looking for the lost luggage. After nine months of fruitless waiting, respondents filed a case to recover the lost items, as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents, which decision was affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, deleting moral and exemplary damages.

Issues:

(1) Whether petitioner is liable for the loss of the luggage

(2) Whether the damages sought should be recovered

Held:

(1) The cause of the loss in the case at bar was petitioner's negligence in not ensuring that the doors of the baggage compartment of its bus were securely fastened. As a result of this lack of care, almost all of the luggage was lost, to the prejudice of the paying passengers.

(2) There is no dispute that of the three pieces of luggage of Fatima, only one was recovered.

 Respondents had to shuttle between Bicol and Manila in their efforts to be compensated for the loss. During the trial, Fatima and Marisol had to travel from the United States just to be able to testify. Expenses were also incurred in reconstituting their lost documents. Under these circumstances, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals in awarding P30,000.00 for the lost items and P30,000.00 for the transportation expenses, but disagrees with the deletion of the award of moral and exemplary damages which, in view of the foregoing proven facts, with negligence and bad faith on the fault of petitioner having been duly established, should be granted to respondents in the amount of P20,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively.

TRANSPO Ganzon vs. CA

Ganzon vs. CA

 Facts:

 Tumambing contracted the services of Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan to Manila on board its lighter. Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to Niza, the captain of the lighter. The loading begun on the same day of the delivery. When about half of the scrap was loaded, the Mayor demanded from Tumambing P5,000.00; upon resistance, Tumambing was injured by a gunshot from the Mayor. After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron resumed. The Acting Mayor with three policemen, however, ordered Niza and his crew to drop the scrap iron to the water. He then issued a receipt stating the the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron.

 Issue:

 WON the carrier should be held liable.

 Held: YES.

 By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the petitioner-carrier’s extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.

The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to any of the following causes enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, namely:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

Hence, the petitioner is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.

Besides, the intervention of the municipal officials was not In any case, of a character that would render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation. The petitioner was not duty bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the sea the scrap iron.

TRASPO TABACALERA INSURANCE CO VS NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES case digest

TABACALERA INSURANCE CO., PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE & ASSURANCE, INC., and NEW ZEALAND INSURANCE CO., LTD., vs.NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 119197. May 16, 1997

Facts:

Sacks of grains were loaded on board a vessel owned by North Front Shipping (common carrier); the consignee: Republic Floor Mills. The vessel was inspected by representatives of the shipper prior to the transport and was found fitting to carry the cargo; it was also issued a Permit to Sail. The goods were successfully delivered but it was not immediately unloaded by the consignee. There were a shortage of 23.666 metric tons and some of the merchandise was already moldy and deteriorating. Hence, the consignee rejected all the cargo and demanded payment of damages from the common carrier. Upon refusal, the insurance companies (petitioners) were obliged to pay. Petitioners now allege that there was negligence on the part of the carrier. The trial court ruled that only ordinary diligence was required since the charter-party agreement converted North Front Shipping into a private carrier.

 Issues:

WON North Front Shipping is a common carrier. If indeed, did it fail to exercise the required diligence and thus should be held liable?

 Held:

 North Front Shipping is a common carrier. Thus, it has the burden of proving that it observed extraordinary diligence in order to avoid responsibility for the lost cargo.

The charter-party agreement between North Front Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills Corporation did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier. A “charter-party” is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or usex x x

Having been in the service since 1968, the master of the vessel would have known at the outset that corn grains that were farm wet and not properly dried would eventually deteriorate when stored in sealed and hot compartments as in hatches of a ship. Equipped with this knowledge, the master of the vessel and his crew should have undertaken precautionary measures to avoid or lessen the cargo’s possible deterioration as they were presumed knowledgeable about the nature of such cargo.

 But none of such measures was taken.

It did not even endeavor to establish that the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods was due to the following: (a) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (b) act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; © act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (d) the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (e) order or act of competent public authority. This is a closed list. If the cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is rightly liable therefor.

However, the destruction, loss or deterioration of the cargo cannot be attributed solely to the carrier. The consignee Republic Flour Mills Corporation is guilty of contributory negligence. It was seasonably notified of the arrival of the barge but did not immediately start the unloading operations.

TRANSPO SOUTHERN LINES INC VS CA

DOCTRINE:If the fact of improper packing is known to the carrier or his servants, or apparent upon ordinary observation, but it accepts the goods notwithstanding such condition, it is not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom.

FACTS:

-    The City of Iloilo requisitioned for rice from the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC).
-    NARIC shipped 1,726 sacks of rice consigned to the City of Iloilo on board of SS General Wright belong to Southern Lines.
-    The City of Iloilo received the shipment and paid the amount stated in the bill of lading (around Php 63K).
-    However, at the bottom of the bill of lading, it was noted that City of Iloilo received the merchandise in the same condition as when shipped, except that it received only 1,685 sacks.
-    Upon actual weighing, it was discovered that the shortage was equal to 41 sacks of rice.
-    Thus, the City of Iloilo filed a complaint against NARIC and Southern Lines for the recovery of the value of the shortage of the shipment of rice (Php 6,486.35).
-    The lower court absolved NARIC but sentenced Southern Lines to pay the amount. 
-    CA affirmed.
-    Hence, this petition for review.
-    Southern Lines claims exemption from liability by contending that the shortage in the shipment of rice was due to such factors as shrinkage, leakage or spillage of the rice on account of the bad condition of the sacks at the time it received the same and negligence of the agents of City of Iloilo in receiving the shipment.

ISSUES:

-    Whether Southern Lines is liable for the loss or shortage of the rice shipped.YES
-    Whether the City of Iloilo is precluded from filing an action for damages on account of its failure to present a claim within 24 hours from receipt of the shipment as stated in the bill of lading.NO

HELD:

-    YES. The SC held that the contention of Southern Lines with respect to the improper packing is untenable.Under Art. 361 of the Code of Commerce, the carrier, in order to free itself from liability, was only obliged to prove that the damages suffered by the goods were “by virtue of the nature or defect of the articles.” Under Art. 362, the plaintiff, in order to hold the defendant liable, was obliged to prove that the damages to the goods is by virtue of their nature, occurred on account of its negligence or because the defendant did not take the precaution adopted by careful persons.It held that if the fact of improper packing is known to the carrier or his servants, or apparent upon ordinary observation, but it accepts the goods notwithstanding such condition, it is not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom.

-    NO. The SC noted that Southern Lines failed to plead this defense in its answer to City of Iloilo’s complaint and, therefore, the same is deemed waived and cannot be raised for the first time.The SC also cited the finding of the CA that City of Iloilo filed the action within a reasonable time; that the action is one for the refund of the amount paid in excess, and not for damages or the recovery of shortage; the bill of lading does not at all limit the time for the filing of action for the refund of money paid in excess.

TRANSPO Vasquez vs CA Case Digest

Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals 

(138 SCRA 553) 

Facts: MV Pioneer Cebu left the port of Manila and bounded for Cebu. Its officers were aware of the upcoming typhoon Klaring that is already building up somewhere in Mindanao. There being no typhoon signals on their route, they proceeded with their voyage. When they reached the island of Romblon, the captain decided not to seek shelter since the weather was still good. They continued their journey until the vessel reached the island of Tanguingui, while passing through the island the weather suddenly changed and heavy rains fell. Fearing that they might hit Chocolate island due to zero visibility, the captain ordered to reverse course the vessel so that they could weather out the typhoon by facing the strong winds and waves. Unfortunately, the vessel struck a reef near Malapascua Island, it sustained a leak and eventually sunk. 

The parents of the passengers who were lost due to that incident filed an action against Filipinas Pioneer Lines for damages. The defendant pleaded force majeure but the Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it reversed the decision of the lower stating that the incident was a force majeure and absolved the defendants from liability. 

Issue: Whether of not Filipinas Pioneer Lines is liable for damages and presumed to be at fault for the death of its passenger? 

Held: The Supreme Court held the Filipinas Pioneer Lines failed to observe that extraordinary diligence required of them by law for the safety of the passengers transported by them with due regard for all necessary circumstance and unnecessarily exposed the vessel to tragic mishap. Despite knowledge of the fact that there was a typhoon, they still proceeded with their voyage relying only on the forecast that the typhoon would weaken upon crossing the island of Samar. The defense of caso fortuito is untenable. To constitute caso fortuito to exempt a person from liability it necessary that the event must be independent from human will, the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, the obligor must be free from any participation or aggravation to the injury of the creditor. Filipina Pioneer Lines failed to overcome that presumption o fault or negligence that arises in cases of death or injuries to passengers.

TRANSPO Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. IAC, 150 SCRA 463

Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. IAC, 150 SCRA 463

Doctrine:
When a carrier fails to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by law of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies.

FACTS:

Carrier – Eastern Shipping Lines Inc

Shipper/Consignee –Stresstek Post Tensioning Philippines Inc

Insurer - First Nationwide Assurance Corporation

Arrastre Operator – E. Razon Inc. (not significant)

Eastern Shipping Lines Inc shipped uncoated 7-wire stress relieved wire strand for prestressed concretewere shipped on board the vessel "Japri Venture,". Upon arrival at the port of Manila, it discharged thecargo to the custody of the defendant E. Razon, Inc. from whom the consignee's customs brokerreceived it for delivery to the consignee's warehouse. First Nationwide Assurance, indemnified theconsignee in the amount of P171,923.00 for damage and loss to the insured cargo, whereupon theformer was subrogated for the latter. The insurer now seeks to recover from the defendants what ithas indemnified the consignee. The petitioner protested alleging that it should not be hel liable to

answer for damages for the event that caused the rusting of the goods was due to the “encounteredvery rough seas and stormy weather” classified as force majeure, hence relieving them of any liability.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a case against petitioner.

RTC– dismissed the case

CA –set aside RTC’s decision and ordered petitioner to pay respondent

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner was negligent and should be held liable for the payment of damages.

HELD:

            YES. Plainly, the heavy seas and rains referred to in the master's report were not

caso fortuito, but normal occurrences that an ocean-going vessel, particularly in the month of September which, in our area, is a month of rains and heavy seas would encounter as a matter of routine. They are not unforeseen nor unforeseeable. These are conditions that ocean-going vessels would encounter and provide for, in the ordinary course of a voyage. That rain water (not sea water) found its way into the holds of the Jupri Venture is a clear indication that care and foresight did not attend the closing of the ship's hatches so that rainwater would not find its way into the cargo holds of the ship.

            Moreover, under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are bound to observe "extra-ordinary vigilance over goods . . . .according to all circumstances of each case," and Article 1735 of the same Code states, to wit:

            Art. 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733.

            Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by law of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code in order to escape liability for damage or destruction to the goods that it had admittedly carried in this case. No such evidence exists of record. Thus, the carrier cannot escape liability.

            The presumption, therefore, that the cargo was in apparent good condition when it was delivered by the vessel to the arrastre operator by the clean tally sheets has been overturned and traversed. The evidence is clear to the effect that the damage to the cargo was suffered while aboard petitioner's vessel.

TRANSPO Loadstar Shipping Co. v. CA by princesslawyer

Loadstar Shipping Co. v. CA

Facts:

On November 19, 1984, Loadstar received on board its vessel M/V Cherokee the following goods for shipment:

1. 705 bales of lawanit hardwood

2. 27 boxes and crates of tilewood assemblies and others

3. 49 bundles of mouldings R & W (3) Apitong Bolidenized

The goods, amounting to P6,067,178, were insured by Manila Insurance Co. The vessel is insured by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. On November 20, 1984, on its way to Manila from Agusan, the vessel sank off Limasawa Island. MIC paid the consignee P6,075,000 for the value of the goods lost, and filed a complaint against Loadstar and PGAI, claiming subrogation into the rights of the consignee. When PGAI paid Loadstar, it was dropped from the complaint. The trial court ruled against Loadstar, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Loadstar submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued a certificate of public convenience, it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route, and there was only "one shipper, one consignee for a special cargo." In refutation, MIC argues that the issue as to the classification of the M/V "Cherokee" was not timely raised below; hence, it is barred by estoppel. While it is true that the vessel had on board only the cargo of wood products for delivery to one consignee, it was also carrying passengers as part of its regular business. Moreover, the bills of lading in this case made no mention of any charter party but only a statement that the vessel was a "general cargo carrier." Neither was there any "special arrangement" between LOADSTAR and the shipper regarding the shipment of the cargo. The singular fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one shipper is not sufficient to convert the vessel into a private carrier.

LOADSTAR argues that as a private carrier, it cannot be presumed to have been negligent, and the burden of proving otherwise devolved upon MIC. It also maintains that the vessel was seaworthy, and that the loss was due to force majeure. LOADSTAR goes on to argue that, being a private carrier, any agreement limiting its liability, such as what transpired in this case, is valid. Since the cargo was being shipped at "owner’s risk," LOADSTAR was not liable for any loss or damage to the same. Finally, LOADSTAR avers that MIC’s claim had already prescribed, the case having been instituted beyond the period stated in the bills of lading for instituting the same — suits based upon claims arising from shortage, damage, or non-delivery of shipment shall be instituted within sixty days from the accrual of the right of action. MIC, on the other hand, claims that LOADSTAR was liable, notwithstanding that the loss of the cargo was due to force majeure, because the same concurred with LOADSTAR’s fault or negligence. Secondly, LOADSTAR did not raise the issue of prescription in the court below; hence, the same must be deemed waived. Thirdly, the "limited liability" theory is not applicable in the case at bar because LOADSTAR was at fault or negligent, and because it failed to maintain a seaworthy vessel. Authorizing the voyage notwithstanding its knowledge of a typhoon is tantamount to negligence.

Issues:

(1) Whether Loadstar was a common carrier or a private carrier

(2) Whether Loadstar exercised the degree of diligence required under the circumstances

(3) Whether the stipulation that the goods are at “the owner’s risk” is valid

(4) Whether the action has prescribed

Held:

(1) We hold that LOADSTAR is a common carrier. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience, and this public character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic, occasional, episodic or unscheduled. There was no charter party. The bills of lading failed to show any special arrangement, but only a general provision to the effect that the M/V "Cherokee" was a "general cargo carrier." Further, the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one shipper, which appears to be purely coincidental, is not reason enough to convert the vessel from a common to a private carrier, especially where, as in this case, it was shown that the vessel was also carrying passengers.

(2) The doctrine of limited liability does not apply where there was negligence on the part of the vessel owner or agent. LOADSTAR was at fault or negligent in not maintaining a seaworthy vessel and in having allowed its vessel to sail despite knowledge of an approaching typhoon. In any event, it did not sink because of any storm that may be deemed as force majeure, inasmuch as the wind condition in the area where it sank was determined to be moderate. Since it was remiss in the performance of its duties, LOADSTAR cannot hide behind the "limited liability" doctrine to escape responsibility for the loss of the vessel and its cargo.

(3) Three kinds of stipulations have often been made in a bill of lading. The first is one exempting the carrier from any and all liability for loss or damage occasioned by its own negligence. The second is one providing for an unqualified limitation of such liability to an agreed valuation. And the third is one limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight. According to an almost uniform weight of authority, the first and second kinds of stipulations are invalid as being contrary to public policy, but the third is valid and enforceable. Since the stipulation in question is null and void, it follows that when MIC paid the shipper, it was subrogated to all the rights which the latter has against the common carrier, LOADSTAR.

(4) MIC’s cause of action had not yet prescribed at the time it was concerned. Inasmuch as neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Commerce states a specific prescriptive period on the matter, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) — which provides for a one-year period of limitation on claims for loss of, or damage to, cargoes sustained during transit — may be applied suppletorily to the case at bar. This one-year prescriptive period also applies to the insurer of the goods. In this case, the period for filing the action for recovery has not yet elapsed. Moreover, a stipulation reducing the one-year period is null and void; it must, accordingly, be struck down.

TRANSPO First Philippine Industrial Corp. vs. CA by princess lawyer

First Philippine Industrial Corp. vs. CA

Facts:

Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387. Sometime in January 1995, petitioner applied for mayor’s permit in Batangas. However, the Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on gross receipts amounting to P956,076.04. In order not to hamper its operations, petitioner paid the taxes for the first quarter of 1993 amounting to P239,019.01 under protest. On January 20, 1994, petitioner filed a letter-protest to the City Treasurer, claiming that it is exempt from local tax since it is engaged in transportation business. The respondent City Treasurer denied the protest, thus, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas for tax refund. Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the term “common carrier” which refers solely to ordinary carriers or motor vehicles. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether a pipeline business is included in the term “common carrier” so as to entitle the petitioner to the exemption

Held:

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person, corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public."

The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:

(1) He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;

(2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;

(3) He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and over his established roads; and

(4) The transportation must be for hire.

Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier.

TRANSPO Baliwag Transit vs. CA

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Baliwag vs. Court of Appeals

Baliwag Transit vs. CA

(GR 116110, 15 May 1996)

FACTS:

On 31 July 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her 5-year old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver.

At about 7:30 p.m., in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers saw a cargo truck, owned by A & J Trading, parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was too narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road obviously to serve as a warning device. The truck driver, and his helper were then replacing a flat tire.

Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiago’s passengers urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed. Santiago even carried animated conversations with his co-employees while driving. When the danger of collision became imminent, the bus passengers shouted “Babangga tayo!”. Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck killing him instantly and the truck’s helper, and injury to several others among them herein respondents.

Thus, a suit was filed against Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio Recontique for damages in the RTC of Bulacan. After trial, it found Baliwag Transit, Inc. liable for having failed to deliver Garcia and her son to their point of destination safely in violation of Garcia’s and Baliwag Transit’s contractual relation; and likewise found A & J and its truck driver liable for failure to provide its cargo truck with an early warning device in violation of the Motor Vehicle Law. All were ordered to pay solidarily the Garcia spouses. 

On appeal, the CA modified the trial court’s Decision by absolving A & J Trading from liability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Baliwag should be held solely liable for the injuries.

HELD:

Yes.

As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destination safe and sound. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.

Article 1759 of the Civil Code provides that “Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willfull acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of the common carriers do not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision of their employees.”

Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code provides “Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at the corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or, is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at night at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered. ”

x x x However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to serve as an early warning device. This substantially complies with Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. The law clearly allows the use not only of an early warning device of the triangular reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible 100 meters away. Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself admitted that a kerosene lamp is an acceptable substitute for the reflectorized plates. No negligence, therefore, may be imputed to A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV-31246) with the modification reducing the actual damages for hospitalization and medical fees to P5,017.74; without costs.

CRIM PRO JUDGE ABELITA III v. DORIA

JUDGE ABELITA III v. DORIA

GR.no. 170672

Facts:

 Judge Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages against P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez. Petitioner alleged that while he andhis family are on their way home, these two officers requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp BoniSerrano, Masbate, Masbate. He was forcibly taken and was searched without warrant. A shotgun was found in his possession and hewas arrested. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. The trial court found that petitionerwas at the scene of the shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. The trial court ruled that the police officers who conducted the searchwere of the belief, based on reasonable grounds, that petitioner was involved in the incident and that the firearm used in the

commission of the offense was in his possession. The trial court ruled that petitioner’s warrantless arrest and the warrantl

ess seizure ofthe firearms were valid and legal,

thus, rejecting petitioner’s claim for frame up.

Issue:

Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules onCriminal Procedure;

Ruling:

 No.For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just committed anoffense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrestedhas committed it.Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness thecommission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track downpetitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle,prompting the police authorities to give chase.

Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they

investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine applies when the followingrequisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a positionfrom which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediatelyapparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.The police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearmsinside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was

involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime, hence they were justified inseizing the firearms.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. 

                  The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it isimmediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 

                 

             In Abelita III vs. Doria, the Supreme Court stated that the police officers were justified in seizing the firearms because the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms(ABELITA III vs. DORIA, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009, First Division, Carpio, J.).

                  

            Relative thereto, it bears emphasis that the “plain view doctrine” may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. (VALEROSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009, Third Divisio, Nachura, J.).

                    

            As the Supreme Court enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr. (413 Phil 249 (2001), and  and People v. Leangsiri, 322 Phil. 226 (1996):

                  

            “What the “plain view” cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the “plain view” doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges”(People v. Cubcubin, Jr. (413 Phil 249 (2001), and  and People v. Leangsiri, 322 Phil. 226 (1996) cited in VALEROSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009, Third Division, Nachura, J.).

CRIM PRO BORLONGAN JR VS PEÑA

THE PROSECUTOR IS NOT MANDATED TO REQUIRE THE RES PONDENT TO SUBMIT HIS COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS TO OPPOSE THE COMPLAINT:

     While probable cause should first be determined before an information may be filed in court, the prosecutor is not mandated to require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint. In the determination of probable cause, the prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. If he does not find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient reason to proceed with the case, he shall issue a resolution and file the corresponding information (TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR. ET AL. VS. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, ET AL. G.R. NO. 143591, MAY 5, 2010, SECOND DIVISION, PEREZ, J.).